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1 Introduction
Radio Frequency (RF) channels and networks are often used to carry in-
formation whose existence may be necessary for organizational operation,
or whose content must remain inaccessible to third parties. Cryptographic
solutions are commonly employed to render the information on RF links un-
intelligible to unauthorized recipients, though the existence and nature of
the links themselves may assist an adversary in conducting attacks on the
system, such as behavioral analysis or denial of service. So, it is prudent that
radio system administrators implement RF security plans that are broad in
scope, not being limited to only cryptographic solutions, but also including
means of foiling other forms of analysis (e.g. open-source, visual). As in
other arenas, Operations Security (OPSEC) is integral to the security of the
system as a whole.
Here we will consider a few ways in which an adversary may gather infor-
mation about our RF systems and resources. Some techniques are universally
applicable, perhaps with minor modifications, and some are applicable only
to certain types of systems. The information here should be used in conjunc-
tion with other security practices to approach total system security.
This is an unscientific introduction to basic radio frequency system OPSEC
aspects that I have found to be overlooked and lacking in high security sys-
tem deployments that may have benefited from them. Please email me at
the address above with any comments, corrections, or suggested additions.
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2 Cryptographic Security
A common and inappropriate way to protect information on a wireless net-
work is obfuscation. Such “protection” relies on the assumption that some
attribute of the wireless communication protocol makes access by unintended
recipients prohibitively difficult. Obfuscation of the signal may be inten-
tional, or it may be a side effect of the technology used for the system. Po-
lice departments have increasingly moved toward digital trunking systems for
their radio communication. These systems were not extremely accessible to
the general public, so listening in on the networks required time and effort.
Such “security” fails for two reasons. First, a determined and knowledge-
able adversary will have little trouble overcoming the difficulties imposed by
the protocol, and accessing the communication. Second, technology rapidly
advances, and such protocol based hurdles are continually lowered. To refer-
ence our previous example, commercial digital trunking radio receivers (both
hardware and software) have become increasingly available and affordable,
and are capable of decoding many common protocols.
Encryption, properly implemented, is effective in obscuring the content
of communications. Where encryption fails, implementation is generally to
blame, as was the case in the very well known Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) security weaknesses [4].
Encryption occurs on many levels, with the level of cryptographic security
generally increasing with the number of layers. A hurdle to using encryption
at each communication endpoint (e.g. computer) and wireless node is key dis-
tribution. In high security environments, encryption is generally done at the
border of each internal network (for example, at the network edge routers),
as well as at the RF system endpoints. The cryptographic keys may differ
for each system and link, and should be changed regularly. In the case of a
spoke-hub system topology as is commonly found in satellite communication
(SATCOM) networks, each node uses a unique key to communicate with the
gateway (hub).
In United States Department of Defense lexic, the encrypted portion of
a network is referred to as black, and the unencrypted portion as red. Black
and red system components and links are physically isolated so that elec-
tromagnetic leakage will not compromise the unencrypted communication.
Often, the red equipment is placed in its own secure facility or room.
Many systems implement a session key. A session key is used once, and
securely discarded once after the session comes to an end. Such practice
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ensures that should an adversary recover one key, they will only be able to
decode a relatively small amount of their intercepted encrypted communica-
tions.
Cryptography is very useful for protecting the contents of radio com-
munications, if properly implemented, if a sufficiently strong cryptographic
algorithm is used, and if good key management practices are adhered to. But
as we have mentioned, sometimes the nature of the wireless communications
assist an adversary in implementing an attack against a system. So, one will
want to minimize the amount of information that is easily available about
their systems, even when good encryption is used.
3 Open-source Analysis
Open-source intelligence may be provided by governing entities for radio
systems that meet certain criteria (e.g. that exceed a certain height, or
belong to a certain class of operation). In the United States the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) Universal Licensing System (ULS) [3]
and Antenna Structure Registration (ASR) [2] databases provide information
on many systems and antennas. This information includes physical location,
registrant details, frequencies, and other information which may be useful
in enumerating the systems controlled by a target and their locations, or
identifying the owner of a given resource (e.g. antenna).
If one must register their radio systems with a public database, it is advis-
able to use administrative, rather than facility or antenna, addresses where
possible. The amount of information included in public databases should be
constrained to the legal minimum, where OPSEC is a prime motivator. An
inquiry into the FCC ASR database is shown in Figure 1.
4 Imagery and Visual Analysis
Using tools such as Google Earth or some based on the Geographic informa-
tion system (GIS), one may find and to some degree identify radio system
components. Buildings housing high-power radio equipment require the sup-
port of large air handling units, and often have large generators next to the
main structure. Such clues can help in identifying which facilities are critical
to the radio system under analysis, once an adversary has narrowed down
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Figure 1: An ASR Database Record
the physical area in which the system resides. Antennas, including parabolic
dishes, are often visible, and their size (circumference, length, or height) may
be estimated by using online tools, or overhead land maps provided by local
government (e.g. county).
An adversary can infer many things about a radio system by simply seeing
the antenna attached to it. The type, size, and orientation of an antenna
reveal a lot about the system, as do logos and other markings.
Parabolic antennas, also known as dishes or satellite dishes, have two uses
in communications: line-of-site, and satellite communication systems. Those
used for line-of-site communication point directly to another parabolic an-
tenna, which may be several kilometers away. The range at which line-of-site
communication may occur is limited by the radio horizon, which is approxi-
mately 3.57 · √h kilometers, where h is the height of the antenna in meters;
however, the range is often further limited by other propagation factors such
as diffraction, reflection, and atmospheric attenuation. In general, the direc-
tion in which an antenna points, along with knowledge of its radio horizon,
may allow us to determine a direction and approximate maximum range for
the antenna.
Dishes that do not point approximately horizontal may be part of a satel-
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lite communication system. The gain of a parabolic antenna is proportional
to its size; the size does not directly identify the frequency of the system.
Regardless, we can infer some facts about the system by the size of the dish.
Larger dishes are used where more gain is required, so systems with big
parabolic antennas might be communicating with geosynchronous satellites,
and may be transmitting as well as receiving.
When determining if a dish is part of a line-of-site or satellite communica-
tions system, one should take care to realize that the inclination of a satellite
dish depends on the location of the satellite and on the latitude of the dish.
Further, many dishes use an offset configuration, where the feed horn is not
located directly above the center of the dish, and the physical inclination
does not correspond to the RF inclination. So, it is possible to come across
satellite antennas that appear to be pointed quite horizontally. Dishes that
do not move, or move very little, are communicating with geosynchronous
satellites or are a line-of-site endpoint. To determine if a stationary dish that
seems to be pointing horizontal is a satellite or a line-of-site antenna, first
calculate the geosynchronous look angle for your latitude, and reference the
caveats in the previous paragraphs.
The frequencies used in satellite and line-of-site communication systems
vary, but are often between the Ultra high frequency (UHF) and Extremely
high frequency (EHF) bands. If a waveguide is visible, its size can assist
in narrowing down the frequency range of an antenna: bigger waveguides
correspond to lower frequencies. However, visual identification of waveguides
in terms of frequency takes some practice.
We will now consider antennas other than parabolic dishes. Antennas
vary greatly in size, configuration, and function. Understanding the function
of an antenna, which may be derived from its physical attributes, may pro-
vide information about the system connected to it, its intended recipient(s),
and perhaps its purpose. In many antennas the size of the antenna, or at least
its driven element, is a fraction (often 1/4), of the operating wavelength of
the system attached to it. Each antenna has an associated radiation pattern
and bandwidth, which may be approximated by referencing data sheets for
antennas of the same type. Some antennas are very directional, and others
approach omnidirectional transmission. Visual examination of an antenna
provides information as to its directionality and orientation. For antennas
that operate locally (e.g. within the confines of an urban area), as may be de-
termined by the operating frequency of the system (clues given by antenna
size), high directionality may imply a point-to-point system configuration.
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For antennas that operate over a large geographic area by taking advantage
of High Frequency (HF) shortwave propagation, high directionality at the
transmitter generally means a broad coverage area far from it. Antennas
that approximate omnidirectional propagation exist for the cases where the
transmitter(s) or receiver(s) are mobile, or where there are multiple geo-
graphically diverse transmitter(s) or receiver(s).
Directionality affects the susceptibility of a radio system’s communica-
tion to interception. As previously mentioned, interception of a signal may
be useful not only due to the information the signal contains, but also for
behavioral analysis (if countermeasures are not implemented to counteract
it), identification of the target’s systems and facility locations, and possibly,
denial of service. Interception may be easy, as is the case when the signal
to be observed is being sent from a satellite (the signal is available through-
out the satellite’s footprint), or difficult (the target system utilizes highly
directional antennas.) If interception is difficult, one might still be able to
intercept transmitter’s communications by utilizing techniques given in the
next section.
If overhead imagery is available, one may be able to approximate the
size of dishes and other antennas. If one has visual access to the transmit-
ting antenna, they may be able to discern unique visual identifiers such as
logos, that can be used in conjunction with the physical identifiers already
mentioned (size, construction) to identify the antenna. Once identified, in-
formation such as frequency, bandwidth, and side lobe power are readily
available online.
It is good OPSEC to protect antennas from visual observation, when the
application or recipient of the associated system is secret. One example of
how this may be done is by covering the antenna with a radiation dome
(Radome). Note that one must protect their system from observers on the
ground, as well as from overhead view by systems such as Google Earth.
5 Advanced Interception
Without direct access to the main transmission beam, one must rely on other
methods to obtain access to the signal. Electromagnetic waves have charac-
teristics that differ by frequency. For example, SATCOM relies on frequen-
cies in bands that pass with acceptable attenuation through the atmosphere,
while shortwave radio takes advantage of the properties of lower frequency
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(a) A parabolic dish [6] (b) A log-periodic directional an-
tenna [5]
(c) Directional panel antennas, as
used for Wi-Fi or cellular telephone
[1]
(d) Large omnidirectional broadcast
antenna [7]
Figure 2: Some common antenna types
(HF) radio waves to allow for geographically distant communication without
satellites.
Some properties that may allow an adversary to indirectly access an RF
signal are properties that are familiar from our understanding of light: reflec-
tion and diffraction. Quantifying these effects in a given environment, with
a unique set operating parameters and obstacles (which cause the reflection
and diffraction) is likely prohibitively difficult, and in many cases such ef-
fects will be very minimal or perhaps even non-existent, where an antenna
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has a high look angle or no obstructions exist in the radiation path. Having
determined the frequency at which the antenna operates, an adversary may
simply wander around the area around the transmitter (around being relative
to transmit power and frequency), to determine if usable stray RF energy
from the target system is accessible. Keep in mind that it may be possible
for an attacker to create an obstruction to reflect some transmit energy to
their own equipment, if the transmit beam is reachable.
Antennas transmit in a primary direction, referred to as the main lobe.
Natural, though generally undesirable lobes of energy exist outside of the
main lobe. These occur at predictable intervals, and are referred to as side
lobes. Reference the Internet for information on a particular antenna’s side
lobe configuration. It may be possible to place a receiver in a side lobe to
receive some transmitted energy. The strength of the side lobes are dependent
on the antenna and transmit power.
To increase the difficulty an adversary will have intercepting an RF signal
through reflection, diffraction, or by placing a receiver in a side lobe, one
should plan their network so that antennas are placed as high as is practical,
are pointed in a direction free from obstructions, and are as directive as is
practical for the application. Finally, transmit power should be kept as low
as possible, while maintaining acceptable link characteristics such as signal-
to-noise ratio).
6 Conclusion: Pulling it All Together
We have focused primarily on an adversary obtaining access to our RF energy,
most of the time ignoring whether or not our communication is encrypted. In
the case of unencrypted communication, or encrypted communication with
unencrypted control (protocol) information, the utility of interception de-
pends on the value the adversary places on the communication or control
information. For links that are entirely encrypted, access to the RF energy
may provide the attacker with information to assist in behavioral or geo-
graphical analysis of our systems. For example, if transmitters are on when
communication is taking place, and off when communication is not, an at-
tacker can use access to the encrypted channel to help determine when high
levels of user activity are taking place. The directional orientation and char-
acteristics (e.g. frequency, power) of antennas may allow the adversary to
discern approximate location of nodes, as well as what sort of systems are
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being used. The type of system being used may assist in determining the
purpose of the communication supported by the system.
The level of paranoia (i.e. OPSEC) necessary for a given system or net-
work is dependent on the value placed on the system and the information it
contains. Value of an individual system decreases as the number and quality
of backup systems increases. Security controls are subjective and one must
weigh the costs and benefits when making a determination concerning which
security controls to implement.
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